Fine-Grained Static Detection of Obfuscation Transforms Using
  Ensemble-Learning and Semantic Reasoning by Tofighi-Shirazi, Ramtine et al.
Fine-Grained Static Detection of Obfuscation Transforms Using
Ensemble-Learning and Semantic Reasoning
Ramtine Toghi-Shirazi
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Institut
Fourier
Trusted Labs, ales Group
6 rue de la Verrerire
Meudon, France
ramtine.toghishirazi@thalesgroup.c
om
Irina Ma˘riuca Asa˘voae
Trusted Labs, ales Group
6 rue de la Verrerire
Meudon, France
irina-mariuca.asavoae@thalesgroup
.com
Philippe Elbaz-Vincent
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Institut
Fourier
100 Rue des Mathematiques
F-38000 Grenoble, France
philippe.elbaz-vincent@univ-grenob
le-alpes.fr
ABSTRACT
e ability to eciently detect the soware protections used is at a
prime to facilitate the selection and application of adequate deob-
fuscation techniques. We present a novel approach that combines
semantic reasoning techniques with ensemble learning classica-
tion for the purpose of providing a static detection framework for
obfuscation transformations. By contrast to existing work, we pro-
vide a methodology that can detect multiple layers of obfuscation,
without depending on knowledge of the underlying functionality of
the training-set used. We also extend our work to detect construc-
tions of obfuscation transformations, thus providing a ne-grained
methodology. To that end, we provide several studies for the best
practices of the use of machine learning techniques for a scalable
and ecient model. According to our experimental results and
evaluations on obfuscators such as Tigress and OLLVM, our models
have up to 91% accuracy on state-of-the-art obfuscation transfor-
mations. Our overall accuracies for their constructions are up to
100%.
KEYWORDS
machine learning, ensemble learning, deobfuscation, obfuscation,
reverse engineering, symbolic execution
1 INTRODUCTION
Code obfuscation is a widely used soware protection technique
to mitigate the risks of reverse-engineering. It aims at protecting
intellectual property by hiding the logic and data of a code. e use
of code obfuscation transformations depends on the sensitivity of
the application. Its applications are mainly digital right manage-
ment, soware licensing code or white-box cryptography, among
others. Malicious codes also use extensively code obfuscation to
hide their intent, evade detection and hinder analyses.
In order to properly evaluate obfuscation transformations, or
to eciently analyze malwares, many deobfuscation techniques
have emerged. eir goal is to remove the protection layers applied
on the code. e deobfuscation process can be seen as dierent
strategies such as reverting, simplifying, or gathering information
about the obfuscated code. In this paper we mainly focus on infor-
mation gathering, particularly the static detection of obfuscation
transformations. We also study an extension to the transformations
constructions, namely the dierent methods employed for a specic
obfuscation transformation to be achieved (e.g. dispatch-methods
for control-ow aening or code virtualization). is approach is
previously known as metadata recovery aacks [53].
State-of-the-art deobfuscation techniques are oen specic to
obfuscation transformations. For example, the work of Udupa et
al. [64] targets control-ow transformations, whereas others [6, 42,
47, 62] aim at removing opaque predicates. Generic deobfuscation
techniques, however, make no assumption about the applied pro-
tections [54, 71]. ese techniques are based on dynamic symbolic
execution and may lack in code coverage and scalability.
ough obfuscation transformations are semantic-preserving,
they may introduce side eects to the code [14]. Each transforma-
tions has its own construction methodology, thus specic paerns.
Recent works try to tackle the detection of soware protections us-
ing machine learning or deep learning techniques. Ugarte-Pedrero
et al. [65] propose a semi-supervised learning approach in order to
classify packed and unpacked binaries. Sun et al. [59], and more
recently Biondi et al. [7], aim at detecting and identifying packers
using machine learning techniques. Toghi-Shirazi et al. [61] pro-
pose a deobfuscation methodology for invariant opaque predicates
based on machine learning techniques.
From the variety of obfuscation techniques, as well as deobfus-
cation methodologies, the ability to eciently detect the soware
protections used is at a prime. To that end, the recent work of
Salem et al. [53] focuses on the detection of obfuscation transfor-
mations. eir goal is to facilitate the selection and application of
adequate deobfuscation techniques. To the best of our knowledge,
their work is the rst to tackle code obfuscation detection using
machine learning. However, their methodology is also prone to
some limitations as explained next.
Current limitations. Existing detection technique for code obfus-
cation [53] based on machine learning techniques comes with the
following limitations:
(1) Code dependency: machine learning and syntax-reasoning
used for the detection of obfuscation transformations can
lead to code dependency. Namely, the trained model be-
comes dependent to the analyzed code used in the training
set, thus lowering its accuracy.
(2) Multi-class problem: the methodology used relies on multi-
class problems for classication. Namely, they consider
that one binary cannot be obfuscated with more than one
obfuscation transformation. However, transformations can
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be combined, thus the necessity to be able to detect the
several applied layers.
(3) Granularity: the detection technique has a high-level of
granularity. ey may detect an obfuscation transforma-
tion, but they do not focus on their constructions. e laer
is of importance in order to decide which analysis to apply
on obfuscated code. Many transformations constructions
are made to prevent existing deobfuscation techniques.
Figure 1: Control-ow graph of a quick-sort function obfus-
cated using several Tigress transformations.
Motivation. When applying obfuscation transformations for so-
ware protections, stealth is sometimes not desired. Many applica-
tions aim for dissuasion in order to prevent reverse-engineering.
In any case, the goal of our methodology is to provide a static and
automated framework to help reverse-engineers. By detecting ob-
fuscation transformations, and more specically their constructions,
an analyst will gain an important amount of time. e selection of
the deobfuscation process to apply requires such knowledge before-
hand. A motivating example is illustrated in Figure 1. It represents
the obfuscated control-ow graph of a quick-sort function. Based
on the previously introduced problems, our goal is to answer the
following questions:
• Complexity: can we detect all applied layers of obfuscation
transformation?
• Granularity: can we detect the constructions of applied
obfuscation transformations?
• Eciency: can we create accurate and generic enough mod-
els for unknown data?
As previously discussed in [53], metadata recovery aacks are usu-
ally manual tasks, therefore a potential boleneck in the reverse
engineering process. Our methodology, which could be plugged-in
a disassembler framework, provides all applied transformation and
construction and allows reverse-engineers to setup automated deob-
fuscation strategies. As an example, several opaque predicates con-
structions prevent SMT-solver based deobfuscation techniques [70].
Other recent works prevent the application of dynamic symbolic
execution techniques [5, 44]. us, knowing which transformations
and constructions analysts are facing may prevent using unadapted
techniques for the deobfuscation process.
Contributions. In order to face the above limitations and answer
our motivating questions, we bring the following contributions:
(1) A novel methodology that combines semantic reasoning
with ensemble learning techniques applied for a multi-label
and multi-output ensemble model. We believe that seman-
tic reasoning will prevent our model from code dependency
limitations, and provides us with the ability to detect sev-
eral combined layers of obfuscation transformations.
(2) An extension of our methodology for a ne-grained detec-
tion. Based on our main approach, a second classication
model is used for the detection of the transformations con-
structions, based on a multi-class classication model (i.e.
one unique label per instances).
(3) Several studies and experiments that justify the construc-
tions of our methodology. We compare dierent machine
learning approaches and techniques in order to build ef-
cient and scalable models. We also evaluate our methodol-
ogy against state-of-the-art obfuscators such as Tigress [12]
and Obfuscator-LLVM [29] (i.e. OLLVM).
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the back-
ground information about code obfuscation and targeted transfor-
mations. We also introduce related work, as well as notions of
supervised machine learning. Section 3 describes our methodol-
ogy which combines semantic reasoning with ensemble learning.
Section 4 contains our studies and experiments towards an e-
cient implementation of our methodology. Section 5 illustrates our
evaluations on state-of-the-art and publicly available obfuscators.
Section 6 briey discuss the application of our methodology to
setup deobfuscation strategies. en, we discuss our design limita-
tions in Section 7, as well as our perspectives in Section 8. Finally,
Section 9 presents our conclusions.
Limitations. While our results illustrate the interest of the method-
ology, evaluating the exact gain of the dierent components of the
approach and experimental comparison to related contributions
are le as future work.
2 BACKGROUND
We briey present code obfuscation and some of the employed trans-
formations. en we introduce several notions related to supervised
machine learning and metadata recovery aacks introduced in [53].
2.1 Code obfuscation
Collberg et al. [14] dene code obfuscation as follows:
Let P T−→ P ′ be a transformation T of a source program P into a
target program P ′. We call P T−→ P ′ an obfuscating transformation
if P and P ′ have the same observable behavior, P ′ is harder to an-
alyze than P , and P ′ is no more than polynomially slower than P .
Consequently, the following conditions must be fullled for an ob-
fuscating transformation : if P fails to terminate, or terminates with
an error condition, then P ′ may or may not terminate; otherwise,
P ′ must terminate and produce the same output as P .
2.2 Obfuscation transformations
An obfuscation transformation T can be classied into dierent
categories such as data obfuscation, static code obfuscation, and
dynamic code obfuscation. Early techniques are given by Coll-
berg et al. [13, 14]. A classication of all these obfuscations, as
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well as known deobfuscation methods has been provided by S.
Schriwieser et al. [56]. e following paragraphs present a non-
exhaustive list of obfuscation transformations.
2.2.1 Encodings. Static data within binaries, such as strings or
constant values, contain useful information for an analyst. Encod-
ing, as an obfuscation transformationT , converts data to a dierent
representation. To this end, special encoding functions are em-
ployed to mitigate the need of storing the static data in clear text
within the binary. During execution, the inverse function is used to
decode the obfuscated data. To prevent paern-matching aacks,
the obfuscated representation must be parameterized in order to
have a family of representations. In other words, each representa-
tion renders dierent-looking obfuscated variables. However, they
are all based on the same obfuscating algorithm.
2.2.2 Instructions substitutions. Each program behavior can be
implemented in multiple ways [68]. In other words, instructions
or sequences of instructions can be replaced with syntactically
dierent, yet semantically equivalent code. As an example, complex
instruction substitution include the replacement of call instructions
with a combination of push and ret instructions [35]. De Suer
et al [60] replaced infrequently used opcodes with blocks of more
frequently used instructions in their work. is transformation
reduced the total number of dierent opcodes used in the code and
normalizes their frequency.
2.2.3 Opaque predicates. An opaque predicate [15] represents
an obfuscated predicate with its outcome known at obfuscation
time, but dicult to determine for a deobfuscator. Opaque predi-
cates are used to make static reverse-engineering more complex.
ey introduce an analysis problem which is dicult to solve with-
out running the program. ere are two types of invariant opaque
predicates and the two-ways opaque predicates. Collberg et al.
dened these predicates by, respectively, PT , PF and P? opaque
predicates. Several works use two-ways opaque predicates con-
structs, either referred to as range-dividers [4], or as correlated
opaque predicates [42, 69]. Moreover, regardless of their output,
e.g. their type, there exists many dierent kinds of construction
that produce the opaque predicates.
2.2.4 Control-flow flaening. is obfuscation transformation
aims at obscuring links between basic-blocks by aening the
control-ow. Wang et al. [67] describe as chenxication this trans-
formation, which puts the basic-blocks of a program into a large
switch-statement. A dispatcher decides then where to jump next.
Control-ow aening using a central dispatcher is also described
by Chow et al. [11]. A similar concept by Lynn and Debray [38] uses
what is called branch functions, which directs the control-ow to the
actual target based on a call table. Further control-ow obfuscation
constructions are described in [10, 17, 36, 46, 55].
2.2.5 Code virtualization. Code virtualization describes the con-
cept of converting a program functionality into byte-code for a
custom virtual machine interpreter that is bundled with the pro-
gram [23, 31]. is obfuscation transformation can also be com-
bined with polymorphism by implementing custom virtual machine
interpreters and payloads for each instance of the program [2].
Other work [66] proposes the combination of ne-granular encryp-
tion and code virtualization to hide the virtual machine code from
analysis. Collberg et al. [14] describe a variant of this concept under
the term table interpretation. A similar concept by Monden et al. [43]
uses a nite state machine-based interpreter to dynamically map
between instructions and their semantics. us, code virtualization
proposes many constructions, as for previous transformations.
2.2.6 Dynamic code modification. In this technique, similar
functions are obfuscated by providing a general template in memory
that is patched right before its execution [14]. Static analysis tech-
niques fail to analyze the program, as its functionality is available at
runtime only. Other concepts of dynamic code modication [30, 40]
implement the idea of correcting intentionally erroneous code at
runtime, right before execution.
Our goal in this paper is to evaluate our methodology against
the previously presented obfuscation transformations. Beforehand,
the next section will recall some notions about supervised machine
learning techniques for classication.
2.3 Supervised machine learning
Supervised machine learning [26, 33] provides a dedicated methodol-
ogy to produce general hypotheses from external supplied instances
via a given algorithm. From these hypotheses, predictions about
future instances are possible. e aim of a supervised machine
learning is to build a classication model which will be used to
assign labels to unknown instances. In other words, let X be an
input (i.e. instance) and Y the output (i.e. predicted label). A super-
vised machine learning algorithm will be used to learn the mapping
function f such that Y = f (X ). e goal is to approximate f such
that for any new instance X we can predict its label Y . In our case
the inputs are represented by n-dimensional vectors of numeri-
cal features for which the extraction is described in the following
paragraph. e traditional single-label classication associates an
instanceX with a unique labelY ′ from a previously known nite set
of labels L. is approach is then considered a binary classication
problem if |L| = 2, or a multi-class classication problem if |L| > 2.
Other approaches exist, such as the multi-label classication. In
this case, an instance X is associated with a set of labels SY ′ ⊂ L.
Moreover, if the model is based on a mapping function f that can
return a set of multiple labels, we have a multi-output classication
model. In our work, we use all these classication problems as
described in Section 3.
2.3.1 Feature extraction. Instances of a machine learning model
are usually derived from what is called raw data, i.e. the data
samples we want to classify or predict. ese data samples cannot
be directly given to a classication model and need to be processed
beforehand. is processing step is called feature extraction [25]
and consists in combining the raw data variables into numerical
features. It allows to eectively reduce the amount of data that must
be processed, while accurately describing the original dataset of
raw data. In our case, raw data are text documents (e.g. disassembly
code, symbolic execution state, etc.). erefore, one practical use of
feature extraction consists in extracting the words (i.e. the features)
and classify them by frequency of use (i.e. weights). Dierent
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approaches exist for understanding what a word is and to compute
its weight. In this paper we use the bag of words approach [41], which
identies terms with words using term frequency, in order to extract
the features for our model. It is an ecient and simple approach
which ts adequately our semantic reasoning approach.
2.3.2 Classification algorithms. e choice of which specic
learning algorithm to use is a critical step. Many classication
algorithms exist [28], each of them having dierent mapping func-
tions. Classication is a common application of machine learning.
As such, there are many metrics that can be used to measure and
evaluate our models. In order to compute these metrics, k-Fold
Cross-Validation [32] is a frequently used technique. e denition
of k-fold cross-validation consists in reserving a particular set of
samples on which the model does not train. e limited set of
samples allows to estimate how the model is expected to perform
on data not used during the training phase. e parameter k refers
to the number of groups that a given dataset of samples is split
into, in order to calculate the mean of our models accuracy as well
as the F1-score based on the value of k . While the accuracy of the
model represents the ratio of correctly predicted labels to the total
of labels, F1-score takes both false positives and negatives into ac-
count. In our experimentations and evaluations, the accuracies and
F1-scores are calculated using k-fold cross-validation, with k = 10
for a beer generalization of our model to unknown instances.
Another application of cross-validation, introduced in [53], con-
sists in a functionality-based folding. In other words, the learning
set and training set are divided based on the functionality of the
samples from which the raw data are generated. e goal of such
evaluation methodology is to measure if the model is dependent to
the underlying code functionality, independently of the obfuscation
transformation applied. e next paragraph introduce furthermore
the work of Salem et al. [53], known as metadata recovery aack.
2.4 Related work: Metadata recovery attack
Salem et al. [53] introduce the use of machine learning techniques
to evaluate the stealth of obfuscation transformations throughout
their detection (known as metadata recovery aack). eir pri-
mary hypothesis is that machine learning techniques are capable
of implementing these aacks by classifying obfuscated programs
according to the transformations applied. eir experiments are
based on two learning algorithms, namely Naive Bayes [22] and
Decision trees [52]. eir raw data are based on static disassembly
or dynamic instruction traces, either stripped or not. us, we refer
to such raw data generation as syntax-reasoning. e evaluation of
their models is made with two classication techniques. e rst
one is a traditional k-fold cross validation, with k = 10. e second
one is more ne-tuned since it discriminates the training and test
dataset on program functionality. In other words, the test dataset
is excluded of any raw data that have been used in the training
dataset, based on the functionality they implement. Such process is
also repeated 10 times, to calculate the average accuracy for each
fold. eir results are promising, showing up to 100% of accuracy
for obfuscation transformations detection with decision trees, on
dynamic traces. However, these results are obtained with the con-
ventional cross-validation, whereas the second classication mode
provides lower results (up to 61% of accuracy) with decision trees.
is indicates that their model is dependent of the functionality
implemented in their raw data. Moreover, their work is not imple-
mented yet to cover several layers of obfuscation transformations,
as it can be the case in most obfuscated programs. In our work, we
also used both cross-validation approach to compare our results
with their work. is gives an brief idea about the advantages of
semantic reasoning over syntax-based approaches.
Our goal in this paper is to combine semantic reasoning and more
advanced machine learning classication techniques in order to
improve the accuracy. We want to have a static analysis tool, based
on symbolic execution, in order to have a model that does not
depend on the functionality of the program. e models are used
to detect several layers of obfuscation transformations, thus having
a multi-label and multi-output classication problem. en, we
extend our detection not only to the obfuscation transformations
but also to their constructions. To this end, in the next section, we
present our approach and methodology.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section we present our methodology composed of several
steps, as illustrated in Figure 2. I. In order to create our models, we
generate obfuscated as well as clean samples. is generation is
done using publicly available obfuscators, specically Tigress and
OLLVM. II. We employ then semantic reasoning via symbolic execu-
tion1 to extract our raw data, from the generated samples. is step
is presented in Section 3.1. III. We create two dierent datasets
for two dierent kinds of classications. Using labeled raw data,
we build our datasets for the detection of obfuscation transforms,
including several combinations. Another dataset is made for the
detection of specic constructions related to the transformations.
ese steps are introduced in Section 3.4. IV. e previous datasets
are used to train our models. In order to select the most relevant
approach and learning algorithms, several studies and experiments
are provided in Section 4. V. e nal step consists in their evalua-
tion and their application on unknown instances, as presented in
Section 5.
3.1 Semantic reasoning
Static symbolic execution is a binary analysis technique that cap-
tures the semantics (i.e. logic) of a program. An interpreter is used
to trace the program, while assuming symbolic values for inputs
rather than obtaining concrete values as a normal execution would.
A symbolic state S is built and consists in a set of symbolic expres-
sions S for each variables (i.e. registers, memory, ags, etc.). Several
techniques exist for symbolic execution [3]. In order to avoid path
explosions in static symbolic execution, we use an intra-procedural
and bloc-centric approach, as summarized next.
3.1.1 Bloc-centric intra-procedural symbolic execution. We use
semantic reasoning for the generation of our raw data. e symbolic
representation helps to eciently detect obfuscation transforma-
tions and constructions. Raw data refers to the representation of
data samples, containing noisy features, which need to be processed
1In our work we consider semantic retrieval only. We are not interested in generating
inputs for program exploration.
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Figure 2: Design steps for ne-grained static detection of obfuscation transformations and constructions.
in order to extract the informative characteristics to train the mod-
els. For the detection of obfuscation transformations, we choose to
work on disassembled functions of binary code. On these functions,
we apply static symbolic execution to retrieve their semantic rep-
resentation. In our work we use disassembled functions to collect
the symbolic expressions from the code, as illustrated in Algorithm
1. First, the semantic reasoning part of our methodology is given
a disassembled function F as input. For the learning phase of our
methodology, F needs to be labeled. In other words, we need to
know which transformations are applied in order to properly train
our model. However, in order to use our methodology as a static and
automated detection framework, F does not require to be labeled
once the models are trained. Based on F , we iterate over each basic
Algorithm 1 semantic reasoning for raw-data generation
1: procedure semantic reasoning(F : a disassembled function)
2: Initialize a dictionary L
3: for each basic block B in F do
4: IB ← getInstructions(B)
5: IRB ←getIntermediateLanguage(IB )
6: SB ←symbolicExecution(IRB )
7: NSB ←normalizeSemantics(SB )
8: L[B] ← NSB
9: end for
10: textFile = generateRawData(L, F )
11: return textFile
12: end procedure
block B. We then collect the instructions of B, denoted by IB , with
the function дetInstructions(). IB is translated into an intermediate
language, denoted by IRB , using getIntermediateLanguage().
Finally, IRB is being used for the bloc-centric symbolic execution
function symbolicExecution(). e laer will return the sym-
bolic state SB , in order words, expressions of each modied vari-
ables in a static single assignment form, based on the intermediate
representation IRB previously used. e generated semantics SB is
then normalized using normalizeSemantics() function. Finally,
the normalized semantics NSB is added to the dictionary L contain-
ing all normalized semantics for each processed basic block B. e
content of L will be used to generate our raw data as text le. Our
normalization step has the crucial role of making the model scale
to unknown data. Next, Section 3.2 describes this step, along with
the content of our raw data.
3.2 Semantic-based raw data
Intermediate representations oen use concrete values within their
generated expressions. is causes raw data to depend on addresses
that are specic to some binaries and prevents our models to scale
on unknown data. Some intermediate representations also use
identiers in order to express modied registers or memory areas.
1 ExprMem ( ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( ' R S P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f d 0 ,
6 4 ) ) , s i z e =64 ) = Expr Id ( ' R D I i n i t ' , s i z e =64 )
2 Expr Id ( ' a f ' , s i z e =1 ) = E x p r S l i c e ( ExprOp ( ' ˆ ' , ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( ' R S P i n i t ' ,
s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f c 8 , 6 4 ) ) , ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( '
R S P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 8 , 6 4 ) ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x30 ,
6 4 ) ) , 4 , 5 )
3 Expr Id ( ' RBP ' , s i z e =64 ) = ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( ' R S P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0
x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 8 , 6 4 ) )
4 ExprMem ( ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( ' R S P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f c 8 ,
6 4 ) ) , s i z e =32 ) = E x p r S l i c e ( Expr Id ( ' RDX in i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , 0 , 3 2 )
5 Expr Id ( ' pf ' , s i z e =1 ) = ExprOp ( ' p a r i t y ' , ExprOp ( '& ' , ExprMem ( E x p r I n t ( 0 x606078 ,
6 4 ) , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x f f , 6 4 ) ) )
6 Expr Id ( 'RAX ' , s i z e =64 ) = ExprMem ( E x p r I n t ( 0 x606078 , 6 4 ) , s i z e =64 )
7 Expr Id ( ' IRDst ' , s i z e =64 ) = ExprCond ( ExprMem ( E x p r I n t ( 0 x606078 , 6 4 ) , s i z e =64 ) ,
E x p r I n t ( 0 x40064b , 6 4 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x400644 , 6 4 ) )
8 Expr Id ( ' z f ' , s i z e =1 ) = ExprCond ( ExprMem ( E x p r I n t ( 0 x606078 , 6 4 ) , s i z e =64 ) ,
E x p r I n t ( 0 x0 , 1 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x1 , 1 ) )
9 ExprMem ( ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( ' R S P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0 x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 8 ,
6 4 ) ) , s i z e =64 ) = Expr Id ( ' R B P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 )
10 Expr Id ( ' o f ' , s i z e =1 ) = E x p r I n t ( 0 x0 , 1 )
11 Expr Id ( ' nf ' , s i z e =1 ) = E x p r S l i c e ( ExprMem ( E x p r I n t ( 0 x606078 , 6 4 ) , s i z e =64 ) , 6 3 ,
6 4 )
12 Expr Id ( ' c f ' , s i z e =1 ) = E x p r I n t ( 0 x0 , 1 )
13 Expr Id ( ' RSP ' , s i z e =64 ) = ExprOp ( ' + ' , Expr Id ( ' R S P i n i t ' , s i z e =64 ) , E x p r I n t ( 0
x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f c 8 , 6 4 ) )
14 Expr Id ( ' RIP ' , s i z e =64 ) = E x p r I n t ( 0 x400650 , 6 4 )
15 Expr Id ( ' IRDst ' , s i z e =64 ) = E x p r I n t ( 0 x400650 , 6 4 )
Listing 1: Symbolic state using Miasm2 intermediate
language
is notation may further aect the scalability of our trained mod-
els. For the purpose of having a model that can scale to unknown
data we use a normalization phase. e normalization consists
in replacing all identiers and concrete values by symbols, and
non-alphanumerical characters by alphanumerical words. is is a
necessary step for a complete features extraction phase that some-
times excludes non-alphanumerical characters when working on
text-based raw data. In our methodology, we generate the raw data
using the Miasm2 [18] intermediate language. is language is part
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of the symbolic execution engine that we use for the implemen-
tation of our methodology as IDA Pro plug-in. Additionally, the
normalized Miasm2 intermediate language has also been successful
for the application of machine learning techniques in order to de-
obfuscate opaque predicates [61]. Listing 1 illustrates the symbolic
state S of the rst basic-block of the function quick-sort, which is
illustrated in Figure 1. Note that the complete raw data will contain
the symbolic states of each basic-blocks of the quick-sort function.
We can see that Miasm2 intermediate language uses several key-
words to express the semantics of the basic blocks. For example,
ExprId is used for registers and ExprInt for concrete values. e
registers and concretes values prevent our model from scaling to
unknown data, thus potentially lowering our model accuracy. is
underlines the necessity to normalize the intermediate language
for an ecient semantic reasoning. Listing 16 illustrates the same
basic-block symbolic state, but normalized.
1 ExprMem ( ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v0 ) , s i z e =64 ) = REG1
2 REG2 = E x p r S l i c e ( ExprOp ( op ˆ , ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v1 ) , ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v2 ) , v3
) , 4 , 5 )
3 REG3 = ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v2 )
4 ExprMem ( ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v1 ) , s i z e =32 ) = E x p r S l i c e ( REG4 , 0 , 3 2 )
5 REG5 = ExprOp ( o p p a r i t y , ExprOp ( op & , ExprMem ( v4 , s i z e =64 ) , v5 ) )
6 REG6 = ExprMem ( v4 , s i z e =64 )
7 IRDst = ExprCond ( ExprMem ( v4 , s i z e =64 ) , v7 , v8 )
8 REG8 = ExprCond ( ExprMem ( v4 , s i z e =64 ) , v9 , v10 )
9 ExprMem ( ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v2 ) , s i z e =64 ) = REG9
10 REG10 = v9
11 REG11 = E x p r S l i c e ( ExprMem ( v4 , s i z e =64 ) , 6 3 , 6 4 )
12 REG12 = v9
13 REG13 = ExprOp ( op + , REG0 , v1 )
14 REG14 = v11
15 IRDst = v11
Listing 2: Symbolic state using our normalized Miasm2
intermediate language
Additionally, the normalization step also reduces the size of the raw
data. is helps enhancing the eciency of learning and testing
phase in terms of execution time. e next sections will present the
dierent machine learning techniques used in our methodology.
e purpose is to create automated and ecient models for the
detection of obfuscation transformations, as well as their construc-
tions.
3.3 Ensemble learning
In machine learning, ensemble methods [19] use multiple learning
algorithms. ey are mostly used to obtain beer predictive perfor-
mance than could be obtained from any of the constituent learning
algorithms alone [39, 51]. An ensemble, in this case, consists of a set
of individually trained classiers whose predictions are combined
when processing novel instances. Dierent families of ensemble
learning methods exists, e.g. Bagging [9], Boosting [20, 21] or
Stacking [57]. Since every model has its strengths and weaknesses,
ensemble models combine individual models to help cope with the
weaknesses of each algorithms. In order to select the best possi-
ble predictions from our ensemble, we use a voting [58] algorithm.
Hence, a model is selected to make the nal prediction by a simple
majority vote for accuracy. Our work aims to study the benets of
ensemble learning approach over individual models. us, we base
our core methodology on voting classiers. However, a more in-depth
studies of other approaches could provide beer insights into the
reasons why/if ensemble models get consistenly beer results for
this task.
3.4 Multi-label and multi-class classications
Multi-label classication methods are increasingly required by mod-
ern applications [8, 37]. We use multi-label with multi-output clas-
sication, in order to return all the detected obfuscation layers,
specially when combined. We also focus on multi-class classica-
tions which play a key role in our methodoly due to the following
facts:
(1) the detection of all the applied obfuscation transformations
is a multi-label classication problem. For example, if our set
of labels are the applied transformations, namely control-
ow aening and code virtualization, then one binary
can have both protections. In such case, our methodology
needs to return all predicted labels. We then refer to such
model as a multi-output classication.
(2) the ne-grained detection of the constructions is a multi-
class classication problem. For example, if we know that
control-ow aening is applied on a code, then its con-
structions can only be one unique label (e.g. switch-based,
ifnest-based, indirect, call-based, etc.).
Multi-label classication methods dier from binary or multi-class
approaches. Tsoumakas et al. [63] group multi-label classication
methods into two categories: problem transformation methods that
transform the multi-label classication problem either into one or
more single-label classication problems, and algorithm adaptation
methods that extend specic learning algorithms in order to handle
multi-label data directly. In our methodology we use classier
chains [49], where each model is an ensemble of learning algorithm,
as presented in Section 3.3. We also study the binary relevance
methodology [24] in Section 4. ese two methodologies are briey
introduced in the following paragraphs.
3.4.1 Problem transformationmethods. the binary relevance method
[72] is a problem transformation technique that transforms any
multi-label problem into a binary problem for each label. Hence,
it trains several classiers, one for each class, i.e. one per obfusca-
tion transformations. e union of all classes that are predicted is
taken as the multi-label output. Binary relevance method is popular
due to its easy implementation. However, the main drawback is
that it ignores the possible correlations between labels. Classier
chains [50] however, as opposed to binary relevance method, take
into account the labels correlations. With this methodology we
have for n labels also n binary classiers f0, f1, ..., fn constructed.
e construction is made as a chain where a classier fi uses the
predictions of all its previous classiers fj with j < i . e chain
order is randomly selected in our design.
3.4.2 Algorithm adaptation methods. Algorithm adaptation ex-
tends single label classication to the multi-label context. It is
usually done by changing the decision functions. Some learn-
ing algorithms support multi-label and multi-output classication
(e.g. [73, 74]), whereas others can be extended.
During our experiments, these two classications approaches, and
multi-label problems will be studied in Section 4. Our objective is
to provide the best suited algorithms and techniques for an ecient
and accurate model.
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4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present rst the dataset used, common with
previous related work [53, 61]. Our preliminary studies towards an
ecient implementation of a ne-grained detection framework are
also introduced. All our experiments and evaluations are done on a
Windows 7 laptop, using 16GB of RAM, and an Intel processor.
4.1 Datasets
Our experiments are made on several C code samples. We use
the scikit-learn API [45] for the implementation of the models.
e datasets contain various types of code, each of them having
dierent functionalities in order to have models that do not t to a
specic type of program. e used samples are listed below:
• GNU core utilities (i.e. core-utils) binaries [48] for normal
predicate samples;
• Cryptographic binaries for obfuscated and non-obfuscated
predicates [16];
• Samples from [4] containing basic algorithms (e.g. facto-
rial, sorting, etc.), non-cryptographic hash functions, small
programs generated by Tigress;
• Samples involving the uses of structures and aliases [1, 27].
Our choice is motivated by the samples low ratio of dependencies
and their straightforward compilation. is makes their obfuscation
possible using tools such as Tigress and OLLVM without errors
during compilation. Furthermore, all datasets used for the studies and
evaluations are balanced and contain between 1000 to 5000 samples.
e obfuscation transformations applied are given in Appendix B
and A. e next section will present our studies based on these
datasets.
4.2 Preliminary studies
Our goal in this section is to provide some answers to the following
questions related to our methodology:
• Study 1: when only one obfuscation transformation is
applied, is a single model more eective than ensemble
models for the detection?
• Study 2: when several obfuscation transformations are
applied, can the model from Study 1 be applied to the
multi-label and multi-output classication problems?
• Study 3: when several obfuscation transformations are
applied, is a multi-label and multi-output model more e-
cient than one binary model for each transformation, i.e.
classier chains?
• Study 4: for the ne-grained detection of obfuscation con-
structions, is a single model more ecient than ensemble
models?
Our studies and evaluations present two dierent types of results
based on two dierent evaluations approaches. One is the tradi-
tional k-folds cross-validation with scores in black colored font.
e other is made with the functionality-based cross-validation
approach in red colored font, used in Salem et al. related work [53].
Besides, we use as a traditional single-model random-forest algo-
rithm throughout all our studies. As for the ensemble models, we
combined extra-tree and random-forest learning algorithms. ese
algorithms were selected because they provided the best scores in
terms of accuracy. For simplicity, a preliminary evaluation was
made between several learning algorithms [34] (e.g. decision trees,
k-nearest neighbors, support vector machines, neural network,
naive Bayes, random forest, etc.). In order to select the best en-
semble models, we combined between 2 to 6 single models, and
selected the combination that provided the best scores.
4.2.1 Study 1: In this study we experiment traditional models
against ensemble learning for multi-class classication problems.
Namely, each sample is assigned with a unique label. us our
model returns only one label per sample. We experiment here if
ensemble learning can be more ecient at detecting obfuscation
transformation, when only one layer is applied. erefore, we do
not combine obfuscation transformations for this study. Table 1 il-
Obfuscation transformation Mono-model Ensemble-learning
Tigress transformations Random-forest Extra-tree & Random-forest
EncA 93% / 98% 95% / 100%
EncL 100% / 97% 100% / 100%
EncD 95% / 98% 95% / 100%
AddO 100% / 100% 98% / 100%
Flat 97% / 100% 97% / 100%
Virt 100% / 100% 100% / 100%
Jit 100% / 100% 100% / 100%
clean 91% / 100% 91% / 100%
Overall Accuracy 97% / 99% 97% / 100%
Table 1: Multi-class accuracy and F1-scores per labels for the
detection of Tigress obfuscation transformations (1 layer).
lustrates our results where we see that ensemble-learning provides
a similar accuracy to random-forest, up to 97%, with traditional
cross-validation. e illustrated F1-scores per labels, namely the
obfuscation transforms, also points out that most of them are pred-
icated similarly with both approaches. An exception is made for
arithmetic encoding, i.e. EncA, and opaque predicates, i.e. AddO.
With the functionality-based cross-validation approach however,
the results diers more as observed in red font. Ensemble-learning
technique provides 100% accuracy and F1-score for each classes,
whereas random-forest achieves slightly lower results, with an
average accuracy at 99%. Due to the semantic reasoning of our
methodology, the results are beer with this approach when hav-
ing one layer of obfuscation. Yet, these results are not sucient
to select traditional mono-models over ensemble-learning, or the
opposite way. Hence, the next study will experiment these two
approaches for multi-label and multi-output classication.
4.2.2 Study 2: In the following study, we combine all obfusca-
tion transformations. e goal of our model is to correctly predict
all the applied layers of obfuscation transformation. us, each
sample can have one or more labels. We aim to compare the random-
forest algorithm with the ensemble model based on random-forest
and extra-trees for multi-label and multi-output classication.Our results in Table 2 illustrate that traditional cross-validationprovides a higher overall accuracy for ensemble learning classier
as opposed to random forest. Our ensemble of models scores 92%
as opposed to 90% for random-forest, with F1-scores per labels
above 91%. e functionality-based cross-validation provides lower
results, with an overall accuracy at 83% and at 82% for respectively
random forest and ensemble models. Still, our result indicates that
both approaches can eciently detect several layers of obfuscation
transforms. However, we may improve our results using problem
transformations methods such as classier chains.
e next study will experiment this hypothesis.
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Obfuscation transformation Multi-label mono-model Multi-label ensemble
Tigress transformations Random-forest Extra-tree & Random-forest
EncA 95% / 93% 96% / 92%
EncL 90% / 78% 92% / 85%
EncD 95% / 93% 96% / 92%
AddO 96% / 88% 97% / 88%
Flat 98% / 97% 99% / 91%
Virt 99% / 98% 99% / 99%
Jit 100% / 95% 97% / 92%
clean 90% / 90% 91% / 87%
Overall Accuracy 90% / 83% 92% / 82%
Table 2: Multi-label accuracy and F1-scores per labels for
the detection of Tigress obfuscation transformations (sev-
eral layers).
4.2.3 Study 3: As in the second study, we combine all obfusca-
tion transformations but we use binary classication problem for
multi-label and multi-output classication using classier chains.
Obfuscation transformation Mono-model chain Ensemble chain
Tigress transformations Random-forest Extra-tree & Random-forest
EncA 95% / 92% 97% / 90%
EncL 90% / 80% 93% / 87%
EncD 95% / 92% 97% / 96%
AddO 96% / 92% 97% / 88%
Flat 97% / 97% 99% / 91%
Virt 99% / 98% 99% / 99%
Jit 100% / 90% 100% / 92%
clean 88% / 90% 92% / 90%
Overall Accuracy 90% / 85% 92% / 90%
Table 3: Classier chain accuracy and F1-scores per labels
for the detection of Tigress obfuscation transformations
(several layers).
Our results with standard cross-validation does not dierent much
from previous Study 2 as illustrated in Table 3. e functionality-
based cross-validation provides improved overall accuracies and
F1-scores per labels. Ensemble models used in classier chains pro-
vide 90% of overall accuracy, compared to random-forest used in
classier chains that score 85% of overall accuracy. is study led us
to select ensemble-learning techniques with classier chains in our
methodology since classier chains allow us to create an ecient
and accurate model for the detection of obfuscation transformations
with one or more layers.
4.2.4 Study 4: For this nal study, our goal is to evaluate the
models for the ne-grained detection of an obfuscation transfor-
mation construction. We use in our dataset several Virtualized
Code virtualization Mono-model Ensemble model
Tigress constructions Random-forest Extra-tree & Random-forest
linear-based 100% / 99% 100% / 100%
switch-based 100% / 98% 100% / 100%
if-nest-based 100% / 100% 100% / 100%
Overall Accuracy 100% / 99% 100% / 100%
Table 4: Accuracy and F1-scores per labels for the detection
of Virtualized constructions.
samples with Tigress for our experiment. Tigress allows the
user to select dierent kinds of constructions, such as switch-based,
ifnest-based, linear-based, interpolation-based for example. is ex-
periment is equivalent to Study 1 in the sense that it is a multi-class
classication problem. Namely, each sample has a unique label and
the selected model will return one unique label per instance.
Our results in Table 4 show that both random-forest and ensem-
ble models provides the same F1-scores per labels. eir overall
accuracies with standard cross-validation are also with 100% accu-
racy. With functionality-based cross-validation, ensemble models
are slightly more ecient with a 100% accuracy as opposed to 99%
for mono-model based on random-forest. is led us to select en-
semble models in our methodology also for the classication of
constructions, as it allows a ned-grained detection capability.
5 EVALUATIONS
In this section we evaluate our models with respect to the following
classication problems:
(1) Multi-label and multi-output evaluation: can our model,
based on a classier chain of ensemble models, eciently
and accurately detect all obfuscation transformations when
one or more layers are applied?
(2) Multi-class evaluation: once the obfuscation transformation
detected, can our ensemble model eciently and accurately
detect the construction of the laer?
We use both cross-validation evaluation schemes as detailed in
Section 2.3.2. Our evaluations are made with publicly available
obfuscators, specically Tigress and OLLVM, in order to combine
obfuscation transformations from dierent tools.
5.1 Transformations detection
Our goal is to evaluate the stealth of obfuscation transformation,
either applied as unique layer or combined. We use our multi-label
and multi-output model based on ensemble-models and classier
chain to detect all the transformations applied. To measure the
eciency of our model, we used both traditional and functionality-
based cross-validation as explained in Section 2.3.2. A list of all
combinations of the applied transformations used in our evaluations
can be found in Appendices A and B. Additionally, command line
options for Tigress and OLLVM are given in A.1 and B.1.
Obfuscation transformation Classier Chain
OLLVM Ensemble model
bcf 98% / 98%
a 92% / 95%
sub 82% / 80%
clean 94% / 93%
Overall Accuracy 86% / 89%
Cross-validation execution time 11s for 1000 samples
Table 5: Evaluated accuracy and F1-scores per labels for the
detection combined OLLVM transformations.
5.1.1 OLLVM. Our rst evaluation uses OLLVM. It implements
transformations such as opaque predicates (i.e. bogus control ow,
bcf ), instruction substitutions (i.e. sub) and control-ow aening
(i.e. a). We built a dataset with several combinations of these
transformations (c.f. Appendix B) in order to measure the eciency
of our model. Table 5 shows our results. Our model achieves an
overall accuracy of 86% with traditional cross-validation and 89%
with the functionality-based one. F1-scores for labels bcf, a, and
clean where no transformations are applied, are over 92% and up to
98% for bcf. However, the eciency of our model to detect OLLVM
instructions substitutions transformations, labeled as sub, achieves
a low F1-score at 80%. Further evaluations indicate that sub is oen
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considered clean by our model. us, when combined with other
transformations, sub transformation is oen undetected.
5.1.2 Tigress. Our second evaluation is made with the Tigress
obfuscator. Tigress can generate state-of-the-art transformations
such as dynamic-code generation (i.e. Jit), code-virtualization (i.e.
Virt), control-ow aening (i.e. Flat), opaque predicates (i.e. AddO)
and several encoding (i.e. Arithmetics, Literals and Data, respec-
tively EncA, EncL and EncD), among others. As illustrated in Table
Obfuscation transformation Classier Chain
Tigress Ensemble model
EncA 94% / 90%
EncL 90% / 86%
EncD 92% / 91%
AddO 95% / 96%
Flat 96% / 98%
Virt 99% / 100%
Jit 100% / 100%
clean 91% / 89%
Overall Accuracy 90% / 91%
Cross-validation execution time 114s for 4000 samples
Table 6: Evaluated accuracy and F1-scores per labels for the
detection combined Tigress transformations.
6, our model accuracy is up to 90% with standard cross-validation.
With functionality-based cross-validation, the overall accuracy is
at 91%. F1-scores for heavy transformation such as Virt and Jit
are up to 99% and 100%. e lowest F1-score is for i.e. EncL which
is sometimes considered as a clean sample by our model. Regard-
less, our evaluation underlines the accuracy and eciency of our
methodology against Tigress transformations.
5.1.3 OLLVM and Tigress. For this evaluation we combine both
OLLVM and Tigress datasets. We aim to see if our model is able to
detect common obfuscation transformations. Table 7 shows our
Obfuscation transformation Classier Chain
Tigress and OLLVM Ensemble model
EncA and sub 93% / 90%
EncL 88% / 88%
EncD 90% / 88%
AddO and bcf 95% / 95%
Flat and a 96% / 99%
Virt 99% / 100%
Jit 100% / 100%
clean 83% / 80%
Overall Accuracy 88% / 86%
Cross-validation execution time 143s for 5000 samples
Table 7: Evaluation accuracy and F1-scores per labels for the
detection of both Tigress and OLLVM transformations.
results. F1-scores for heavy transformations such as Virt, Jit and
Flat are high, averaging up to 100% for Jit as an example. Com-
bined test samples between obfuscators such EncA-sub, AddO-bcf,
and Flat-a have high F1-scores, even when combined with other
transformations. ese heavy transformations introduce important
side-eects to the code, allowing an ecient and accurate detec-
tion of our model. e ability to eciently detect non-obfuscated
samples is still low compared to the ability to detect all layers of
obfuscation transformations. In that case, our model F1-scores are
up to 83% and 80% depending on the cross-validation approach
used. Still, our model is averaging an accuracy up to 88% and 86%.
ese overall accuracies illustrate our model eciency regarding
the detection of obfuscation transformations, even when combined,
and between the two dierent obfuscators.
5.1.4 OLLVM vs. Tigress. Our nal evaluation aims to compare
the accuracies of our model depending on the learning dataset used.
First, we use a learning dataset only based on OLLVM transforms.
e model will be then evaluated against some similar obfuscation
transformations generated by Tigress. Second, we do the oppo-
site, namely train our model on Tigress samples to evaluate it
on OLLVM raw data. e results are displayed in Table 8. As we
Training dataset Testing dataset Overall accuracy
OLLVM Tigress (Flat) 100% / 100%
OLLVM Tigress (Flat, AddO) 68% / 61%
Tigress OLLVM (a) 95% / 92%
Tigress OLLVM (all) 82% / 75%
Table 8: Overall accuracies of our model using either OLLVM
or Tigress learning dataset.
can see, our model eciently detects Tigress Flat transformation
when training on 1000 samples of all OLLVM transforms, with 100%
of accuracy. Results are lower when the training dataset is based on
Tigress (4000 samples), against OLLVM a transform, with an over-
all accuracy up to 95% with a standard cross-validation. Moreover,
we can observe that our model cannot eciently detect Tigress
opaque predicates, i.e. AddO, when training only on OLLVM trans-
forms. e results, in that case, indicate that our model eciently
detects the Flat transformation, but only few AddO ones. Finally,
when our model is trained on Tigress, the overall accuracy is up
to 82% against all OLLVM transforms (c.f. Appendix B). is result
indicates that our methodology provides some genericity.
5.2 Constructions detection
In this section we evaluate our model for the detection of specic
obfuscation transformations constructions. We use our multi-class
model, based on ensemble-models, to provide a ne-grained detec-
tion technique. As for previous evaluations, we use traditional and
functionality-based cross-validation techniques.
Control-ow attening Ensemble model
Tigress and OLLVM Extra-tree & Random-forest
switch-based 98% / 95%
if-nest-based 98% / 100%
Overall Accuracy 98% / 97%
Cross-validation execution time 12s for 1000 samples
Table 9: Evaluation accuracy and F1-scores per class for the
detection of control-ow attening constructions.
5.2.1 Control-flow flaening. As for code virtualization, control-
ow aening can also be constructed in several ways, as intro-
duced in Section 2.2. Facing the same limitations as for code vir-
tualization constructions, we evaluated two constructions namely
switch-based from the Tigress obfuscator, and ifnest-based from
OLLVM. e evaluation results are in Table 9. Our model averages
high F1-scores and accuracy, the laer being at 98% with standard
cross-validation evaluation.
5.2.2 Opaque predicates. Many opaque predicates constructions
exists, some of them having as purpose preventing the usage of
existing deobfuscation techniques based on dynamic-symbolic exe-
cution. For the detection of their constructions, we used Tigress,
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OLLVM but also novel bi-opaque methods [70]. Our results in Ta-
ble 10 show that our model is accurately detecting opaque predi-
cates constructions. F1-scores are up to 100% with standard cross-
validation. Bi-opaque constructions are however oen un-detected
when combined with other transformations.
Opaque predicates Ensemble model
Tigress and OLLVM Extra-tree & Random-forest
Floats 85% / 89%
Symbolic-memory 87% / 87%
Arithmetic 100% / 100%
Aliasing 100% / 99%
Mixed-boolean and arithmetic 100% / 96%
Overall Accuracy 95% / 93%
Cross-validation execution time 24s for 1000 samples
Table 10: Evaluation accuracy and F1-scores per class for the
detection of opaque predicates constructions.
Yet, the overall accuracy of our model is at 95% and 93% depend-
ing on the evaluation approach used. is illustrates the eciency
of our methodology towards the detection of obfuscation transfor-
mations constructions.
6 LIMITATIONS
One threat to the validity of our results is that we only use datasets
of relatively small C programs, except for the core-utils binaries
used for non-obfuscated samples. Nevertheless, the samples used
in our dataset involve all common programming language con-
structions and various functionalities (e.g. hash functions, sorts,
cryptographic algorithms, etc.). However, our future work will
include the evaluation of our methodology on other obfuscators or
programs, such as malwares. Our work shows that semantic reason-
ing combined with advanced machine learning present capabilities
for a ne-grained detection of obfuscation transforms.
e capability of detecting unknown transformations or con-
structions represents another limitation of our methodology. If our
model did not train on one specic transformation or constructions,
it will not predict properly the unknown sample. is can lead to a
loss of accuracy when unknown transformations are combined.
Dynamic transformations cause limitations to our model for the
static detection of obfuscation transforms. Despite from the fact that
we are able to accurately detect some of these transformations (i.e.
Jit, Virt), when other obfuscation transformations are applied before
them, our model is less ecient. Moreover, other transformations
such as packing, or anti-symbolic execution techniques may lower
the accuracy of our model. However, as pointed out in the next
section, our methodology can scale to dynamically collected traces
which allows to thwart some of these limitations.
7 PERSPECTIVES AND FUTUREWORK
First, more in-depth studies of aggregation approaches used in
ensemble learning must be done in order to assess if ensemble
learning are consistenly more ecient for that task compared to
mono-models. e hard voting scheme used is a simple approach,
but may not achieve the eective benet of using the ensemble
learning approach.
As seen in [61], semantic reasoning and machine learning pro-
vides promising results for deobfuscation methodology. e evalua-
tions shown in this paper illustrate that our model does not depend
on the code functionality. A more accurate comparison must be
made as future work.
To overcome the dynamic transformations limitations, we can
adapt our methodology to dynamically collected instructions traces.
With a given instructions trace, we reconstruct each basic-blocks
and apply our semantic reasoning approach in order to generate raw
data. is step can be done either for the learning or the evaluation
phase. Our future work consists in extending the implementation
of our current framework and evaluating other combinations of
obfuscation transformations based on dynamic traces.
Another issue we need to consider is the application of n layers
of the same obfuscation transformations. Presently, our evaluations
is done by combining several transformations, but using one time
each of them. Our future study should consider the extension of
our evaluations to the use of one transformation several times.
We also plan on extending our datasets of C programs with more
complex real-world soware libraries in the interest of strengthen-
ing our experiments.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the eciency of semantic reasoning
combined with advanced machine learning techniques. is combi-
nation is motivated by the construction of a ne-grained detection
framework of obfuscation transformations and constructions. By
extending our approach to multi-label and multi-output classica-
tion, we enhanced metadata recovery aacks to the detection of
multiple layers of obfuscation transformations. We proposed a new
approach that combines a bloc-centric symbolic execution with
machine learning ensemble model and classier chains. We used
our models to evaluate the stealth of both obfuscation transforma-
tions and constructions. Our results are promising, with overall
accuracies up to 91% for the transformations and 100% for the con-
structions, showing slight improvements with respect to current
mono-models machine learning. e use of static symbolic execu-
tion allows us to be dependent on the underlying functionality of
the code samples used for the learning phase. Our empirical studies
illustrate that our choices conduct towards the implementation of
an ecient and accurate evaluation framework against state of
the art obfuscators. However, there is still place for improvements
with a more in-depth study of learning algorithms used and their
parameters. Our work slightly improves metadata-recovery aacks,
and paves the way towards the ecient use of advanced machine
learning combined with semantic reasoning.
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A TIGRESS TRANSFORMATIONS
We list the combinations of obfuscation transformations used for
our datasets, in their application order: AddOpaque (16 or 32 times); Ad-
dOpaque, EncodeLiterals; EncodeLiterals; AddOpaque, EncodeArithmetics;
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EncodeArithmetics, AddOpaque; EncodeArithmetics; AddOpaque, Encode-
Data; EncodeData, AddOpaque; EncodeData; AddOpaque, EncodeArith-
metics, EncodeLiterals, EncodeData; EncodeData, EncodeArithmetics, En-
codeLiterals, AddOpaque; AddOpaque, Flaen ; Flaen, AddOpaque; Flat-
ten; Flaen, EncodeData, EncodeArithmetics, EncodeLiterals; Virtualize, Ad-
dOpaque; Virtualize; Virtualize, EncodeData, EncodeArithmetics, EncodeLit-
erals; Virtualize, Flaen; Flaen, AddOpaque, EncodeData, EncodeArith-
metics, EncodeLiterals; Virtualize, AddOpaque, EncodeData, EncodeArith-
metics, EncodeLiterals; Virtualize, Flaen, AddOpaque, EncodeData, En-
codeArithmetics, EncodeLiterals; Jit; Jit, AddOpaque; Jit, AddOpaque, En-
codeData, EncodeArithmetics, EncodeLiterals.
A.1 Commands options
1 # AddOpaque o p t i o n s
2 t i g r e s s −−Transform = I n i t E n t r o p y −−Transform = I n i t O p a q u e −− I n i t O p a q u e S t r u c t s =
l i s t , a r ray , env −−F u n c t i o n s =main −−Transform =AddOpaque −−F u n c t i o n s =${3}
−−AddOpaqueCount=${NUM} −−AddOpaqueKinds= c a l l , f ake , t r u e
3 # F l a t t e n
4 t i g r e s s −−Transform = F l a t t e n −−F l a t t e n D i s p a t c h = swi tch , goto −−F u n c t i o n s =${3}
5 # V i r t u a l i z e
6 t i g r e s s −−Transform = V i r t u a l i z e −−V i r t u a l i z e D i s p a t c h = swi tch , d i r e c t , i f n e s t ,
l i n e a r −−F u n c t i o n s =${3}
7 # J i t
8 t i g r e s s − i n c l u d e $TIGRESS HOME / j i t t e r −amd64 . c −−Transform = J i t −−F u n c t i o n s =$
{3} −− J i t E n c o d i n g = hard
9 # E n c o d e L i t e r a l s
10 t i g r e s s −−Transform = E n c o d e L i t e r a l s −−F u n c t i o n s =${3} −−E n c o d e L i t e r a l s K i n d s =
i n t e g e r , s t r i n g
11 # E n c o d e A r i t h m e t i c s
12 t i g r e s s −−Transform = E n c o d e A r i t h m e t i c −−F u n c t i o n s =${3} −−E n c o d e L i t e r a l s K i n d s =
i n t e g e r
13 # EncodeData
14 t i g r e s s −−Transform =EncodeData −−L o c a l V a r i a b l e s =${4} −−EncodeDataCodecs =poly ,
xor , add −−F u n c t i o n s =${3}
Listing 3: Tigress commands for sample generation
B OLLVM TRANSFORMATIONS
We list the combinations of obfuscation transformations used for our datasets,
in their application order: bcf; bcf, sub; bcf, sub, a; bcf, a, sub; sub; sub,
bcf; sub, bcf, a ; a ; a, bcf ; a, sub, bcf ; a, bcf, sub.
B.1 Commands options
1 # Bogus c o n t r o l −f l o w
2 c l a n g ${1}. c −o ${1} −mllvm −b c f −mllvm −b c f p r o b =50
3 c l a n g ${1}. c −o ${1} −mllvm −b c f −mllvm −b c f p r o b =100
4 # C o n t r o l −f l o w f l a t t e n i n g
5 c l a n g ${1}. c −o ${1} −mllvm − f l a
6 c l a n g ${1}. c −o ${1} −mllvm − f l a −mllvm − s p l i t
7 # I n s t r u c t i o n s u b s t i t u t i o n
8 c l a n g ${1}. c −o ${1} −mllvm −sub
Listing 4: OLLVM commands for sample generation
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